The person who assembled the book How To Become The World's Number 1 Hacker simply copied and pasted this entire page as a large section of its Chapter Two. "Assembled", as I can't really say "wrote". They included a couple of misspellings or wording errors that I hadn't happened to notice (now fixed here), and, most clumsily, the sentence "Also see the COMSEC section of another page of mine for details on how GSM encryption can be broken." That book contains a lot of plagarized text in addition to untrue claims about the background and experience of its "author" — see the analysis here and here.
Sections of this page, jump to a topic:
This page has been clumsily copied and pasted into this book.
Network monitoring or packet sniffing tools are like many other infosec tools. They can be used for good or evil, it all depends on the intent of the user!
I cannot imagine how you could claim to do LAN troubleshooting without capturing packets at times. At the same time, protocols that move sensitive data as cleartext are commonly used (POP and IMAP with the user's account name and password, and FTP and even TELNET are still used a surprising amount), and the bad guy could easily capture user authentication information (login and password) or other sensitive data (complete contents of shared files, copies of every print job submitted, and so on).
So, you have to use these to maintain your networks, and you need to realize that the bad guys could use these against you.
There are various categories of network monitoring tools:
Packetstorm has a wonderful archive of network monitoring tools.
UNIX / Linux / BSD / MacOS X LAN Monitoring Tools
DOS/Windows LAN Monitoring Tools
Wikipedia has a very useful introduction to wireless networking and the security issues.
Kismet running in an OpenBSD xterm window, sniffing packets and observing wireless network activity at the Greyhouse coffeeshop in West Lafayette, Indiana. And yes, they really want you to use their WLAN, so you'll hang out there and buy more coffee.
Note that wireless monitoring tools can be extremely dependent on chipset. Make sure that your planned software and WLAN card will get along!
The Trifinite Group has information on wireless security, including RFIDiot and other RFID security tools and information at trifinite.org.
Also see the COMSEC section of another page of mine for details on how GSM encryption can be broken. Really. It can. GSM salesmen don't want you to know this, but it's true.
D-Link TM-G5240 802.11g wireless router, Cisco EZXS88W 8-port Ethernet switch, and MFJ-1278 multi-mode data controller.
Here's my page on setting up WPA2 / 802.11i wireless security.
Optical fiber can be tapped without splicing. You can read the data by removing some of the sheath and gently bending the fiber in a bend coupler. You can supposedly buy them for a few hundred US$, check eBay.
There are claims that optical taps have been found on police networks in the Netherlands and Germany, and the FBI investigated one discovered on Verizon's network in the US.
For more see:
Interactive keyboard use can be "eavesdropped" by means you might not expect.
Consider the relative difficulty or ease of touch-typing different character sequences on a standard QWERTY keyboard: F-J would be very fast (home key on left hand then home key on right hand, easy and fast) while 2-X would be very slow (extreme reaches for the same finger, awkward and slow).
So, a good typist may have a high aggregate rate of characters per minute, but the inter-character spacings are going to vary. A given two-character or longer sequence is not always going to be exactly the same, but over time the distribution is going to be fairly distinctive.
Measure the inter-character times and you have the data needed for bigram analysis. You won't recover 100% of the cleartext, but with adequate data and quality typing of large blocks of text, you will recover some.
So how can you measure the inter-character times?
Like so much of information theory, this isn't entirely new. A Morse code operator might be recognized by a distinctive "fist" or slight imperfection in their keying cadence.
For suggestions on spotting sniffer attacks, see the discussion in an older CERT advisory. One method would be to send out an Ethernet frame to MAC destination address that is not in use on your network. Inside of that is an IP datagram to which a typical host would reply. The NIC would normally have filtered out (that is, ignored or dropped) that frame because it was sent to some other unicast MAC address. But since its chipset is in promiscuous mode, the filtering is turned off and the IP datagram is passed to the operating system. The operating system then replies, and now you know that host has its interface in promiscuous mode. The sniffer detection relies on tricking the host with a promiscuous interface into reporting itself.
To detect network interfaces in promiscuous mode:
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